Dr. Freire writes from a Third World perspective, but with obvious implications for education in general. He rejects mechanistic conceptions of the adult literacy process, advocating instead a theory and practice based upon authentic dialogue between teachers and learners. Such dialogue, in Freire's approach, centers upon codified representations of the learners' existential situations and leads not only to their acquisition of literacy skills, but more importantly to their awareness of their right and capacity as human beings to transform reality. Becoming literate, then, means far more than learning to decode the written representation of a sound system. It is truly an act of knowing, through which a person is able to look critically at the culture which has shaped him, and to move toward reflection and positive action upon his world.
stance on the educator's part. This stance in turn implies-sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly-an interpretation of man and the world. It could not be otherwise. The process of men's orientation in the world involves not just the association of sense images, as for animals. It involves, above all, thought-lan guage; that is, the possibility of the act of knowing through his praxis, by which man transforms reality. For man, this process of orientation in the world can be understood neither as a purely subjective event, nor as an objective or mechan istic one, but only as an event in which subjectivity and objectivity are united. Orientation in the world, so understood, places the question of the purposes of action at the level of critical perception of reality.
If, for animals, orientation in the world means adaptation to the world, for man it means humanizing the world by transforming it. For animals there is no historical sense, no options or values in their orientation in the world; for man there is both an historical and a value dimension. Men have the sense of "pro ject," in contrast to the instinctive routines of animals.
The action of men without objectives, whether the objectives are right or wrong, mythical or demythologized, naive or critical, is not praxis, though it may be orientation in the world. And not being praxis, it is action ignorant both of its own process and of its aim. The interrelation of the awareness of aim and of process is the basis for planning action, which implies methods, objectives, and value options.
Teaching adults to read and write must be seen, analyzed, and understood in this way. The critical analyst will discover in the methods and texts used by edu cators and students practical value options which betray a philosophy of man, well or poorly outlined, coherent or incoherent. Only someone with a mechan istic mentality, which Marx would call "grossly materialistic," could reduce adult literacy learning to a purely technical action. Such a naive approach would be incapable of perceiving that technique itself as an instrument of men in their orientation in the world is not neutral.
We shall try, however, to prove by analysis the self-evidence of our statement. Let us consider the case of primers used as the basic texts for teaching adults to read and write. Let us further propose two distinct types: a poorly done primer and a good one, according to the genre's own criteria. Let us even suppose that the author of the good primer based the selection of its generative words 1 on a of illiteracy to cure the disease. 4 In this way, deprived of their character as linguis tic signs constitutive of man's thought-language, words are transformed into mere "deposits of vocabulary"-the bread of the spirit which the illiterates are to "eat" and "digest."
This "nutritionist" view of knowledge perhaps also explains the humanitarian character of certain Latin American adult literacy campaigns. If millions of men are illiterate, "starving for letters," "thirsty for words," the word must be brought to them to save them from "hunger" and "thirst." The word, according to the naturalistic concept of consciousness implicit in the primer, must be "deposited," not born of the creative effort of the learners. As understood in this concept, man is a passive being, the object of the process of learning to read and write, and not its subject. As object his task is to "study" the so-called reading lessons, which in fact are almost completely alienating and alienated, having so little, if anything, to do with the student's socio-cultural reality. 5 It would be a truly interesting study to analyze the reading texts being used in private or official adult literacy campaigns in rural and urban Latin America. It would not be unusual to find among such texts sentences and readings like the following random samples: 8 A asa é da ave-"The wing is of the bird." Eva viu a uva-"Eva saw the grape." O galo canta-"The cock crows." O cachorro ladra-"The dog barks." Maria gosta dos animais-"Mary likes animals." João cuida das arvores-"John takes care of the trees."
O pai de Carlinhos se chama Antonio. Carlinhos é um born menino, bem comportado e estudioso-"Charles's father's name is Antonio. Charles is a good, well-behaved, and studious boy."
Ada deu o dedo ao urubu? Duvido, Ada deu o dedo a arara. . . . 7 4 See Paulo Freire, "La alfabetizacion de adultos, critica de su vision ingenua; compreension de su vision critica," in Introductión a la Action Cultural (Santiago: ICIRA, 1969) . 5 There are two noteworthy exceptions among these primers: (1) in Brazil, Viver e Lutar, developed by a team of specialists of the Basic Education Movement, sponsored by the National Conference of Bishops. (This reader became the object of controversy after it was banned as sub versive by the then governor of Guanabara, Mr. Carlos Lacerda, in 1963.) (2) in Chile, the ESPIGA collection, despite some small defects. The collection was organized by Jefatura de Planes Extraordinarios de Educación de Adultos, of the Public Education Ministry. 6 Since at the time this essay was written the writer did not have access to the primers, and was, therefore, vulnerable to recording phrases imprecisely or to confusing the author of one or an other primer, it was thought best not to identify the authors or the titles of the books. 7 The English here would be nonsensical, as is the Portuguese, the point being the emphasis on the consonant d.-Editor Se vocé trabalha com martelo e prego, tenha cuidado para nao furar o dedo.-"If you hammer a nail, be careful not to smash your finger." 8 "Peter did not know how to read. Peter was ashamed. One day, Peter went to school and registered for a night course. Peter's teacher was very good. Peter knows how to read now. Look at Peter's face. [These lessons are generally illustrated.] Peter is smiling. He is a happy man. He already has a good job. Everyone ought to follow his example."
In saying that Peter is smiling because he knows how to read, that he is happy because he now has a good job, and that he is an example for all to follow, the authors establish a relationship between knowing how to read and getting good jobs which, in fact, cannot be borne out. This naiveté reveals, at least, a failure to perceive the structure not only of illiteracy, but of social phenomena in gen eral. Such an approach may admit that these phenomena exist, but it cannot per ceive their relationship to the structure of the society in which they are found. It is as if these phenomena were mythical, above and beyond concrete situations, or the results of the intrinsic inferiority of a certain class of men. Unable to grasp contemporary illiteracy as a typical manifestation of the "culture of silence," directly related to underdeveloped structures, this approach cannot offer an ob jective, critical response to the challenge of illiteracy. Merely teaching men to read and write does not work miracles; if there are not enough jobs for men able to work, teaching more men to read and write will not create them.
One of these readers presents among its lessons the following two texts on con secutive pages without relating them. The first is about May 1st, the Labor Day holiday, on which workers commemorate their struggles. It does not say how or where these are commemorated, or what the nature of the historical conflict was. The main theme of the second lesson is holidays. It says that "on these days people ought to go to the beach to swim and sunbathe …" Therefore, if May 1st is a holiday, and if on holidays people should go to the beach, the conclusion is that the workers should go swimming on Labor Day, instead of meeting with their unions in the public squares to discuss their problems.
Analysis of these texts reveals, then, a simplistic vision of men, of their world, of the relationship between the two, and of the literacy process which unfolds in that world. A asa é da ave, Eva viu a uva, o galo canta, and o cachorro late, are linguistic contexts which, when mechanically memorized and repeated, are deprived of their authentic dimension as thought-language in dynamic interplay with reality. Thus impoverished, they are not authentic expressions of the world.
Their authors do not recognize in the poor classes the ability to know and even create the texts which would express their own thought-language at the level of their perception of the world. The authors repeat with the texts what they do with the words, i.e., they introduce them into the learners' consciousness as if it were empty space-once more, the "digestive" concept of knowledge.
Still more, the a-structural perception of illiteracy revealed in these texts ex poses the other false view of illiterates as marginal men. 9 Those who consider them marginal must, nevertheless, recognize the existence of a reality to which they are marginal-not only physical space, but historical, social, cultural, and economic realities-i.e., the structural dimension of reality. In this way, illiter ates have to be recognized as beings "outside of," "marginal to" something, since it is impossible to be marginal to nothing. But being "outside of" or "marginal to" necessarily implies a movement of the one said to be marginal from the center, where he was, to the periphery. This movement, which is an action, presupposes in turn not only an agent but also his reasons. Admitting the existence of men "outside of" or "marginal to" structural reality, it seems legitimate to ask: Who is the author of this movement from the center of the structure to its margin? Do so-called marginal men, among them the illiterates, make the decision to move out to the periphery of society? If so, marginality is an option with all that it in volves: hunger, sickness, rickets, pain, mental deficiencies, living death, crime, promiscuity, despair, the impossibility of being. In fact, however, it is difficult to accept that 40% of Brazil's population, almost 90% of Haiti's, 60% of Bolivia's, about 40% of Bolivia's, about 40% of Peru's, more than 30% of Mexico's and Venezuela's, and about 70% of Guatemala's would have made the tragic choice of their own marginality as illiterates. 10 If, then, marginality is not by choice, marginal man has been expelled from and kept outside of the social system and is therefore the object of violence.
In fact, however, the social structure as a whole does not "expel," nor is mar ginal man a "being outside of." He is, on the contrary, a "being inside of," within the social structure, and in a dependent relationship to those whom we call false ly autonomous beings, inauthentic beings-for-themselves.
A less rigorous approach, one more simplistic, less critical, more technicist, would say that it was unnecessary to reflect about what it would consider unim portant questions such as illiteracy and teaching adults to read and write. Such an approach might even add that the discussion of the concept of marginality is an unnecessary academic exercise. In fact, however, it is not so. In accepting the illiterate as a person who exists on the fringe of society, we are led to envision him as a sort of "sick man," for whom literacy would be the "medicine" to cure him, enabling him to "return" to the "healthy" structure from which he has be come separated. Educators would be benevolent counsellors, scouring the out skirts of the city for the stubborn illiterates, runaways from the good life, to restore them to the forsaken bosom of happiness by giving them the gift of the word.
In the light of such a concept-unfortunately, all too widespread-literacy pro grams can never be efforts toward freedom; they will never question the very reality which deprives men of the right to speak up-not only illiterates, but all those who are treated as objects in a dependent relationship. These men, illiter ate or not, are, in fact, not marginal. What we said before bears repeating: They are not "beings outside of"; they are "beings for another." Therefore the solution to their problem is not to become "beings inside of," but men freeing themselves; for, in reality, they are not marginal to the structure, but oppressed men within it. Alienated men, they cannot overcome their dependency by "incorporation" into the very structure responsible for their dependency. There is no other road to humanization-theirs as well as everyone else's-but authentic transformation of the dehumanizing structure.
From this last point of view, the illiterate is no longer a person living on the fringe of society, a marginal man, but rather a representative of the dominated strata of society, in conscious or unconscious opposition to those who, in the same structure, treat him as a thing. Thus, also, teaching men to read and write is no longer an inconsequential matter of ba, be, bi, bo, bu, of memorizing an alienated word, but a difficult apprenticeship in naming the world.
In the first hypothesis, interpreting illiterates as men marginal to society, the literacy process reinforces the mythification of reality by keeping it opaque and by dulling the "empty consciousness" of the learner with innumerable alienating words and phrases. By contrast, in the second hypothesis-interpreting illiterates as men oppressed within the system-the literacy process, as cultural action for freedom, is an act of knowing in which the learner assumes the role of knowing subject in dialogue with the educator. For this very reason, it is a courageous en deavor to demythologize reality, a process through which men who had previous ly been submerged in reality begin to emerge in order to re-insert themselves into it with critical awareness.
Therefore the educator must strive for an ever greater clarity as to what, at times without his conscious knowledge, illumines the path of his action. Only in this way will he truly be able to assume the role of one of the subjects of this ac tion and remain consistent in the process.
Part II: The adult literacy process as an act of knowing.
To be an act of knowing the adult literacy process demands among teachers and students a relationship of authentic dialogue. True dialogue unites subjects to gether in the cognition of a knowable object which mediates between them.
If learning to read and write is to constitute an act of knowing, the learners must assume from the beginning the role of creative subjects. It is not a matter of memorizing and repeating given syllables, words, and phrases, but rather of re flecting critically on the process of reading and writing itself, and on the pro found significance of language.
Insofar as language is impossible without thought, and language and thought are impossible without the world to which they refer, the human word is more than mere vocabulary-it is word-and-action. The cognitive dimensions of the literacy process must include the relationships of men with their world. These re lationships are the source of the dialectic between the products men achieve in transforming the world and the conditioning which these products in turn exer cise on men.
Learning to read and write ought to be an opportunity for men to know what speaking the word really means: a human act implying reflection and action. As such it is a primordial human right and not the privilege of a few. 11 Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at the same time associated with the right of self-expression and world-expression, of creating and re-creating, of deciding and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process.
In the culture of silence the masses are "mute," that is, they are prohibited from creatively taking part in the transformations of their society and therefore prohibited from being. Even if they can occasionally read and write because they were "taught" in humanitarian-but not humanist-literacy campaigns, they are nevertheless alienated from the power responsible for their silence.
Illiterates know they are concrete men. They know that they do things. What they do not know in the culture of silence-in which they are ambiguous, dual beings-is that men's actions as such are transforming, creative, and re-creative. Overcome by the myths of this culture, including the myth of their own "natural inferiority," they do not know that their action upon the world is also transform ing. Prevented from having a "structural perception" of the facts involving them, they do not know that they cannot "have a voice," i.e., that they cannot exercise the right to participate consciously in the socio-historical transformation of their society, because their work does not belong to them.
It could be said (and we would agree) that it is not possible to recognize all this apart from praxis, that is, apart from reflection and action, and that to at tempt it would be pure idealism. But it is also true that action upon an object must be critically analyzed in order to understand both the object itself and the understanding one has of it. The act of knowing involves a dialectical movement which goes from action to reflection and from reflection upon action to a new action. For the learner to know what he did not know before, he must engage in an authentic process of abstraction by means of which he can reflect on the ac tion-object whole, or, more generally, on forms of orientation in the world. In this process of abstraction, situations representative of how the learner orients himself in the world are proposed to him as the objects of his critique.
As an event calling forth the critical reflection of both the learners and educa tors, the literacy process must relate speaking the word to transforming reality, and to man's role in this transformation. Perceiving the significance of that rela tionship is indispensible for those learning to read and write if we are really committed to liberation. Such a perception will lead the learners to recognize a much greater right than that of being literate. They will ultimately recognize that, as men, they have the right to have a voice.
On the other hand, as an act of knowing, learning to read and write presup poses not only a theory of knowing but a method which corresponds to the theory.
We recognize the indisputable unity between subjectivity and objectivity in the act of knowing. Reality is never just simply the objective datum, the concrete fact, but is also men's perception of it. Once again, this is not a subjectivistic or idealistic affirmation, as it might seem. On the contrary, subjectivism and idealism come into play when the subjective-objective unity is broken. 12 The adult literacy process as an act of knowing implies the existence of two interrelated contexts. One is the context of authentic dialogue between learners and educators as equally knowing subjects. This is what schools should bethe theoretical context of dialogue. The second is the real, concrete context of facts, the social reality in which men exist. 13 In the theoretical context of dialogue, the facts presented by the real or con crete context are critically analyzed. This analysis involves the exercise of abstrac tion, through which, by means of representations of concrete reality, we seek knowledge of that reality. The instrument for this abstraction in our methodol ogy is codification, 14 or representation of the existential situations of the learners.
Codification, on the one hand, mediates between the concrete and theoretical contexts (of reality). On the other hand, as knowable object, it mediates between the knowing subjects, educators and learners, who seek in dialogue to unveil the "action-object wholes."
This type of linguistic discourse must be "read" by anyone who tries to inter pret it, even when purely pictorial. As such, it presents what Chomsky calls "sur face structure" and "deep structure."
The "surface structure" of codification makes the "action-object whole" ex plicit in a purely taxonomic form. The first stage of decodification 15 -or reading -is descriptive. At this stage, the "readers"-or decodifiers-focus on the relation ship between the categories constituting the codification. This preliminary focus on the surface structure is followed by problematizing the codified situation. This leads the learner to the second and fundamental stage of decodification, the com prehension of the codification's "deep structure." By understanding the codifica tion's "deep structure" the learner can then understand the dialectic which ex ists between the categories presented in the "surface structure," as well as the unity between the "surface" and "deep" structures. 12 There are two ways to fall into idealism: The one consists of dissolving the real in sub jectivity; the other in denying all real subjectivity in the interests of objectivity 15 [Decodification refers to a process of description and interpretation, whether of printed words, pictures, or other "codifications." As such, decodification and decodifying are distinct from the process of decoding, or word-recognition. -Editor.] In our method, the codification initially takes the form of a photograph or sketch which represents a real existent, or an existent constructed by the learners. When this representation is projected as a slide, the learners effect an operation basic to the act of knowing: they gain distance from the knowable object. This experience of distance is undergone as well by the educators, so that educators and learners together can reflect critically on the knowable object which mediates between them. The aim of decodification is to arrive at the critical level of know ing, beginning with the learner's experience of the situation in the "real con text."
Whereas the codified representation is the knowable object mediating between knowing subjects, decodification-dissolving the codification into its constituent elements-is the operation by which the knowing subjects perceive relationships between the codification's elements and other facts presented by the real context -relationships which were formerly unperceived. Codification represents a given dimension of reality as individuals live it, and this dimension is proposed for their analysis in a context other than that in which they live it.' Codification thus transforms what was a way of life in the real context into "objectum" in the theoretical context. The learners, rather than receive information about this or that fact, analyze aspects of their own existential experience represented in the codification.
Existential experience is a whole. In illuminating one of its angles and per ceiving the inter-relation of that angle with others, the learners tend to replace a fragmented vision of reality with a total vision. From the point of view of a theory of knowledge, this means that the dynamic between codification of ex istential situations and decodification involves the learners in a constant re-con struction of their former "ad-miration" of reality.
We do not use the concept "ad-miration" here in the usual way, or in its ethical or esthetic sense, but with a special philosophical connotation.
To "ad-mire" is to objectify the "not-I." It is a dialectical operation which char acterizes man as man, differentiating him from the animal. It is directly associated with the creative dimension of his language. To "ad-mire" implies that man stands over against his "not-I" in order to understand it. For this reason, there is no act of knowing without "ad-miration" of the object to be known. If the act of knowing is a dynamic act-and no knowledge is ever complete-then in order to know, man not only "ad-mires" the object, but must always be "re-ad-miring" his former "ad-miration." When we "re-ad-mire" our former "ad-miration" (always an "ad-miration of) we are simultaneously "ad-miring" the act of "ad-miring" and the object "ad-mired," so that we can overcome the errors we made in our former "ad-miration." This "re-ad-miration" leads us to a perception of an an terior perception.
In the process of decodifying representations of their existential situations and perceiving former perceptions, the learners gradually, hesitatingly, and timorously place in doubt the opinion they held of reality and replace it with a more and more critical knowledge thereof.
Let us suppose that we were to present to groups from among the dominated classes codifications which portray their imitation of the dominators' cultural models-a natural tendency of the oppressed consciousness at a given moment. 16 The dominated persons would perhaps, in self-defense, deny the truth of the codification. As they deepened their analysis, however, they would begin to per ceive that their apparent imitation of the dominators' models is a result of their interiorization of these models and, above all, of the myths of the "superiority" of the dominant classes which cause the dominated to feel inferior. What in fact is pure interiorization appears in a naive analysis to be imitation. At bottom, when the dominated classes reproduce the dominators' style of life, it is because the dominators live "within" the dominated. The dominated can eject the dom inators only by getting distance from them and objectifying them. Only then can they recognize them as their antithesis. 17 To the extent, however, that interiorization of the dominators' values is not only an individual phenomenon, but a social and cultural one, ejection must be achieved by a type of cultural action in which culture negates culture. That is, culture, as an interiorized product which in turn conditions men's subsequent acts, must become the object of men's knowledge so that they can perceive its con ditioning power. Cultural action occurs at the level of superstructure. It can only be understood by what Althusser calls "the dialectic of overdetermination." 18 This analytic tool prevents us from falling into mechanistic explanations or, what is worse, mechanistic action. An understanding of it precludes surprise that cul tural myths remain after the infrastructure is transformed, even by revolution.
When the creation of a new culture is appropriate but impeded by interiorized 16 Re the oppressed consciousness, see: Frantz Fanon, cultural "residue," this residue, these myths, must be expelled by means of cul ture. Cultural action and cultural revolution, at different stages, constitute the modes of this expulsion.
The learners must discover the reasons behind many of their attitudes toward cultural reality and thus confront cultural reality in a new way. "Re-ad-miration" of their former "ad-miration" is necessary in order to bring this about. The learners' capacity for critical knowing-well beyond mere opinion-is established in the process of unveiling their relationships with the historical-cultural world in and with which they exist.
We do not mean to suggest that critical knowledge of man-world relationships arises outside of praxis, a verbal knowledge. Praxis is involved in the concrete situations which are codified for critical analysis. To analyze the codification in its "deep structure" is, for this very reason, to reconstruct the former praxis and to become capable of a new and different praxis. The relationship between the theoretical context, in which codified representations of objective facts are ana lyzed, and the concrete context, where these facts occur, has to be made real.
Such education must have the character of commitment. It implies a movement from the concrete context which provides objective facts, to the theoretical context where these facts are analyzed in depth, and back to the concrete context where men experiment with new forms of praxis.
It might seem as if some of our statements defend the principle that, whatever the level of the learners, they ought to reconstruct the process of human knowing in absolute terms. In fact, when we consider adult literacy learning or education in general as an act of knowing, we are advocating a synthesis between the educa tor's maximally systematized knowing and the learners' minimally systematized knowing-a synthesis achieved in dialogue. The educator's role is to propose prob lems about the codified existential situations in order to help the learners arrive at a more and more critical view of their reality. The educator's responsibility as conceived by this philosophy is thus greater in every way than that of his col league whose duty is to transmit information which the learners memorize. Such an educator can simply repeat what he has read, and often misunderstood, since education for him does not mean an act of knowing.
The first type of educator, on the contrary, is a knowing subject, face to face with other knowing subjects. He can never be a mere memorizer, but a person constantly readjusting his knowledge, who calls forth knowledge from his stu dents. For him, education is a pedagogy of knowing. The educator whose ap proach is mere memorization is anti-dialogic; his act of transmitting knowledge is inalterable. For the educator who experiences the act of knowing together with his students, in contrast, dialogue is the seal of the act of knowing. He is aware, however, that not all dialogue is in itself the mark of a relationship of true knowl edge.
Socratic intellectualism-which mistook the definition of the concept for knowledge of the thing defined and this knowledge as virtue-did not constitute a true pedagogy of knowing, even though it was dialogic. Plato's theory of dialogue failed to go beyond the Socratic theory of the definition as knowledge, even though for Plato one of the necessary conditions for knowing was that man be capable of a "prise de conscience," and though the passage from doxa to logos was indispensable for man to achieve truth. For Plato, the "prise de conscience" did not refer to what man knew or did not know or knew badly about his dialectical relationship with the world; it was concerned rather with what man once knew and forgot at birth. To know was to remember or recollect forgotten knowledge. The apprehension of both doxa and logos, and the over coming of doxa by logos occurred not in the man-world relationship, but in the effort to remember or rediscover a forgotten logos.
For dialogue to be a method of true knowledge, the knowing subjects must ap proach reality scientifically in order to seek the dialectical connections which ex plain the form of reality. Thus, to know is not to remember something previously known and now forgotten. Nor can doxa be overcome by logos apart from the dialectical relationship of man with his world, apart from men's reflective action upon the world.
To be an act of knowing, then, the adult literacy process must engage the learn ers in the constant problematizing of their existential situations. This prob lematizing employs "generative words" chosen by specialized educators in a pre liminary investigation of what we call the "minimal linguistic universe" of the future learners. The words are chosen (a) for their pragmatic value, i.e., as lin guistic signs which command a common understanding in a region or area of the same city or country (in the United States, for instance, the word soul has a spe cial significance in black areas which it does not have among whites), and (b) for their phonetic difficulties which will gradually be presented to those learning to read and write. Finally, it is important that the first generative word be tri-syl labic. When it is divided into its syllables, each one constituting a syllabic family, the learners can experiment with various syllabic combinations even at first sight of the word.
Having chosen seventeen generative words, 19 the next step is to codify seven teen existential situations familiar to the learners. The generative words are then worked into the situations one by one in the order of their increasing phonetic difficulty. As we have already emphasized, these codifications are knowable ob jects which mediate between the knowing subjects, educator-learners, learnereducators. Their act of knowing is elaborated in the circulo de cultura (cultural discussion group) which functions as the theoretic context.
In Brazil, before analyzing the learners' existential situations and the genera tive words contained in them, we proposed the codified theme of man-world re lationships in general. 20 In Chile, at the suggestion of Chilean educaors, this im portant dimension was discussed concurrently with learning to read and write. What is important is that the person learning words be concomitantly engaged in a critical analysis of the social framework in which men exist. For example, the word favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and the word callampa in Chile, represent, each with its own nuances, the same social, economic, and cultural reality of the vast numbers of slum dwellers in those countries. If favela and callampa are used as generative words for the people of Brazilian and Chilean slums, the codifica tions will have to represent slum situations.
There are many people who consider slum dwellers marginal, intrinsically wicked and inferior. To such people we recommend the profitable experience of discussing the slum situation with slum dwellers themselves. As some of these critics are often simply mistaken, it is possible that they may rectify their mythical cliches and assume a more scientific attitude. They may avoid saying that the il literacy, alcoholism, and crime of the slums, that its sickness, infant mortality, learning deficiencies, and poor hygiene reveal the "inferior nature" of its inhabi tants. They may even end up realizing that if intrinsic evil exists it is part of the structures, and that it is the structures which need to be transformed.
It should be pointed out that the Third World as a whole, and more in some parts than in others, suffers from the same misunderstanding from certain sectors of the so-called metropolitan societies. They see the Third World as the incarna tion of evil, the primitive, the devil, sin and sloth-in sum, as historically un viable without the director societies. Such a manichean attitude is at the source of the impulse to "save" the "demon-possessed" Third World, "educating it" and "correcting its thinking" according to the director societies' own criteria.
The expansionist interests of the director societies are implicit in such notions. These societies can never relate to the Third World as partners, since partner ship presupposes equals, no matter how different the equal parties may be, and can never be established between parties antagonistic to each other.
Thus, "salvation" of the Third World by the director societies can only mean its domination, whereas in its legitimate aspiration to independence lies its Utopi an vision: to save the director societies in the very act of freeing itself.
In this sense the pedagogy which we defend, conceived in a significant area of the Third World, is itself a Utopian pedagogy. By this very fact it is full of hope, for to be Utopian is not to be merely idealistic or impractical but rather to en gage in denunciation and annunciation. Our pedagogy cannot do without a vision of man and of the world. It formulates a scientific humanist conception which finds its expression in a dialogical praxis in which the teachers and learners together, in the act of analyzing a dehumanizing reality, denounce it while an nouncing its transformation in the name of the liberation of man.
For this very reason, denunciation and annunciation in this Utopian pedagogy are not meant to be empty words, but an historic commitment. Denunciation of a dehumanizing situation today increasingly demands precise scientific understand ing of that situation. Likewise, the annunciation of its transformation increasing ly requires a theory of transforming action. However, neither act by itself implies the transformation of the denounced reality or the establishment of that which is announced. Rather, as a moment in an historical process, the announced reality is already present in the act of denunciation and annunciation. 21 That is why the Utopian character of our educational theory and practice is as permanent as education itself which, for us, is cultural action. Its thrust toward denunciation and annunciation cannot be exhausted when the reality denounced today cedes its place tomorrow to the reality previously announced in the de nunciation. When education is no longer Utopian, i.e., when it no longer em bodies the dramatic unity of denunciation and annunciation, it is either because the future has no more meaning for men, or because men are afraid to risk living the future as creative overcoming of the present, which has become old.
The more likely explanation is generally the latter. That is why some people today study all the possibilities which the future contains, in order to "domesticate" it and keep it in line with the present, which is what they intend to main tain. If there is any anguish in director societies hidden beneath the cover of their cold technology, it springs from their desperate determination that their metro politan status be preserved in the future. Among the things which the Third World may learn from the metropolitan societies there is this that is fundamen tal: not to replicate those societies when its current Utopia becomes actual fact.
When we defend such a conception of education-realistic precisely to the ex tent that it is Utopian-that is, to the extent that it denounces what in fact is, and finds therefore between denunciation and its realization the time of its praxis -we are attempting to formulate a type of education which corresponds to the specifically human mode of being, which is historical.
There is no annunciation without denunciation, just as every denunciation generates annunciation. Without the latter, hope is impossible. In an authentic Utopian vision, however, hoping does not mean folding one's arms and waiting. Waiting is only possible when one, filled with hope, seeks through reflective ac tion to achieve that announced future which is being born within the denuncia tion.
That is why there is no genuine hope in those who intend to make the future repeat their present, nor in those who see the future as something predetermined. Both have a "domesticated" notion of history: the former because they want to stop time; the latter because they are certain about a future they already "know." Utopian hope, on the contrary, is engagement full of risk. That is why the dom inators, who merely denounce those who denounce them, and who have nothing to announce but the preservation of the status quo, can never be Utopian nor, for that matter, prophetic. 22 A Utopian pedagogy of denunciation and annunciation such as ours will have to be an act of knowing the denounced reality at the level of alphabetization and post-alphabetization, which are in each case cultural action. That is why there is such emphasis on the continual problematization of the learners' existential sit uations as represented in the codified images. The longer the problematization proceeds, and the more the subjects enter into the "essence" of the prob lematized object, the more they are able to unveil this "essence." The more they unveil it, the more their awakening consciousness deepens, thus leading to the "conscientization" of the situation by the poor classes. Their critical self-insertion into reality, i.e., their conscientization, makes the transformation of their state of apathy into the Utopian state of denunciation and annunciation a viable project.
One must not think, however, that learning to read and write precedes "con scientization," or vice-versa. Conscientization occurs simultaneously with the liter acy or post-literacy process. It must be so. In our educational method, the word is not something static or disconnected from men's existential experience, but a dimension of their thought-language about the world. That is why, when they par ticipate critically in analyzing the first generative words linked with their existen tial experience; when they focus on the syllabic families which result from that analysis; when they perceive the mechanism of the syllabic combinations of their language, the learners finally discover, in the various possibilities of combination, their own words. Little by little, as these possibilities multiply, the learners, through mastery of new generative words, expand both their vocabulary and their capacity for expression by the development of their creative imagination. 23 In some areas in Chile undergoing agrarian reform, the peasants participating in the literacy programs wrote words with their tools on the dirt roads where they were working. They composed the words from the syllabic combinations they were learning. "These men are sowers of the word," said Maria Edi Ferreira, a sociologist from the Santiago team working in the Institute of Training and Research in Agrarian Reform. Indeed, they were not only sowing words, but dis cussing ideas, and coming to understand their role in the world better and better.
We asked one of these "sowers of words," finishing the first level of literacy classes, why he hadn't learned to read and write before the agrarian reform.
"Before the agrarian reform, my friend," he said, "I didn't even think. Neither did my friends."
"Why?" we asked. "Because it wasn't possible. We lived under orders. We only had to carry out orders. We had nothing to say," he replied emphatically.
The simple answer of this peasant is a very clear analysis of "the culture of silence." In "the culture of silence," to exist is only to live. The body carries out orders from above. Thinking is difficult, speaking the word, forbidden.
"When all this land belonged to one latifundio," said another man in the same conversation, "there was no reason to read and write. We weren't responsible for anything. The boss gave the orders and we obeyed. Why read and write? Now it's a different story. Take me, for example. In the asentiamiento, 24 I am respon sible not only for my work like all the other men, but also for tool repairs. When I started I couldn't read, but I soon realized that I needed to read and write. You can't imagine what it was like to go to Santiago to buy parts. I couldn't get ori entated. I was afraid of everything-afraid of the big city, of buying the wrong thing, of being cheated. Now it's all different."
Observe how precisely this peasant described his former experience as an il literate: his mistrust, his magical (though logical) fear of the world; his timidity. And observe the sense of security with which he repeats, "Now it's all different."
"What did you feel, my friend," we asked another "sower of words" on a differ ent occasion, "when you were able to write and read your first word?" "I was happy because I discovered I could make words speak," he replied. Dario Salas reports, 25 "In our conversations with peasants we were struck by the images they used to express their interest and satisfaction about becoming literate. For example, 'Before we were blind, now the veil has fallen from our eyes'; 'I came only to learn how to sign my name. I never believed I would be able to read, too, at my age'; 'Before, letters seemed like little puppets. Today they say something to me, and I can make them talk.' "It is touching," continues Salas, "to observe the delight of the peasants as the world of words opens to them. Sometimes they would say, 'We're so tired our heads ache, but we don't want to leave here without learning to read and write.' " 26 The following words were taped during research on "generative themes." 27 They are an illiterate's decodification of a codified existential situation. 24 After the disappropriation of lands in the agrarian reform in Chile, the peasants who were salaried workers on the large latifundia become "settlers" (asentados) during a three-year period in which they receive varied assistance from the government through the Agrarian Reform Corporation. This period of "settlement" (asentamiento) precedes that of assigning lands to the peasants. This policy is now changing. The phase of "settlement" of the lands is being abolished, in favor of an immediate distribution of lands to the peasants. The Agrarian Reform Corporation will continue, nevertheless, to aid the peasants. 25 Dario Salas, "Algumas experiencias vividas na Supervisao de Educacao basica," in A alfa betizncao funcional no Chile. Report to UNESCO, November, 1968. Introduction: Paulo Freire. 26 Dario Salas refers here to one of the best adult education programs organized by the Agrar ian Reform Corporation in Chile, in strict collaboration with the Ministry of Education and ICIRA. Fifty peasants receive boarding and instruction scholarships for a month. The courses center on discussions of the local, regional, and national situations. 27 An analysis of the objectives and methodology of the investigation of generative themes lies outside the scope of this essay, but is dealt with in the author's work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. "You see a house there, sad, as if it were abandoned. When you see a house with a child in it, it seems happier. It gives more joy and peace to people passing by. The father of the family arrives home from work exhausted, worried, bitter, and his little boy comes to meet him with a big hug, because a little boy is not stiff like a big person. The father already begins to be happier just from seeing his children. Then he really enjoys himself. He is moved by his son's wanting to please him. The father becomes more peaceful, and forgets his problems."
Note once again the simplicity of expression, both profound and elegant, in the peasant's language. These are the people considered absolutely ignorant by the proponents of the "digestive" concept of literacy.
In 1968, an Uruguayan team 28 published a small book, You Live as You Can (Se Vive como se Puede), whose contents are taken from the tape recordings of literacy classes for urban dwellers. Its first edition of three thousand copies was sold out in Montevideo in fifteen days, as was the second edition. The following is an excerpt from this book.
THE COLOR OF WATER
Water? Water? What is water used for? "Yes, yes, we saw it (in the picture)." "Oh, my native village, so far away…" "Do you remember that village?" "The stream where I grew up, called Dead Friar … you know, I grew up there, a child hood moving from one place to another… the color of the water brings back good mem ories, beautiful memories."
"What is the water used for?" "It is used for washing. We used it to wash clothes, and the animals in the fields used to go there to drink, and we washed ourselves there, too." "Did you also use the water for drinking?" "Yes, when we were at the stream and had no other water to drink, we drank from the stream. I remember once in 1945 a plague of locusts came from somewhere, and we had to fish them out of the water… I was small, but I remember taking out the locusts like this, with my two hands-and I had no others. And I remember how hot the water was when there was a drought and the stream was almost dry… the water was dirty, muddy, and hot, with all kinds of things in it. But we had to drink it or die of thirst."
The whole book is like this, pleasant in style, with great strength of expression of the world of its authors, those anonymous people, "sowers of words," seeking to emerge from "the culture of silence."
Yes, these ought to be the reading texts for people learning to read and write, and not "Eva saw the grape," "The bird's wing," "If you hammer a nail, be care ful not to hit your fingers." Intellectualist prejudices and above all class prejudices are responsible for the naive and unfounded notions that the people cannot write their own texts, or that a tape of their conversations is valueless since their conversations are impoverished of meaning. Comparing what the "sowers of words" said in the above references with what is generally written by specialist authors of reading lessons, we are convinced that only someone with very pro nounced lack of taste or a lamentable scientific incompetency would choose the specialists' texts.
Imagine a book written entirely in this simple, poetic, free, language of the people, a book on which inter-disciplinary teams would collaborate in the spirit of true dialogue. The role of the teams would be to elaborate specialized sections of the book in problematic terms. For example, a section on linguistics would deal simply, though not simplistically, with questions fundamental to the learn ers' critical understanding of language. Let me emphasize again that since one of the important aspects of adult literacy work is the development of the capacity for expression, the section on linguistics would present themes for the learners to discuss, ranging from the increase of vocabulary to questions about communica tion-including the study of synonyms and antonyms, with its analysis of words in the linguistic context, and the use of metaphor, of which the people are such masters. Another section might provide the tools for a sociological analysis of the content of the texts.
These texts would not, of course, be used for mere mechanical reading, which leaves the readers without any understanding of what is real. Consistent with the nature of this pedagogy, they would become the object of analysis in reading seminars.
Add to all this the great stimulus it would be for those learning to read and write, as well as for students on more advanced levels, to know that they were reading and discussing the work of their own companions….
To undertake such a work, it is necessary to have faith in the people, solidar ity with them. It is necessary to be Utopian, in the sense in which we have used the word.
